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Pragmatism or idealism? 
An urban perspective onto the politics of inter-urban cooperation for sustainability in the EU 
 
Elisabetta Mocca 




European cities have been committed to achieve urban sustainability, participating into inter-
urban networks dealing with socio-ecological issues. By examining the incentives derived by 
the involvement in these networks and the municipal political milieu where the decision about 
network participation is taken, this article seeks to understand the motivations for European 
cities to take part in sustainability networks. To do so, a small-N qualitative analysis was 
undertaken. The results show that cities’ participation in socio-ecological urban networks is 
motivated by the economic, political and formative incentives that membership provides, and 
is influenced by institutionalised values, political agency and previous cooperative experience. 
Keywords: Transnational Municipal Networks; Local Governments; European Union 
Sustainability. 
1. Introduction 
Urban sustainability has become an important area of cooperation among European cities, 
encouraged by the EU institutions to take on a pro-active role to create more sustainable cities. 
In particular, the publication of EU documents1, the implementation of initiatives, such as the 
                                                          
1 One the first document of this kind is the 1990 Green Paper on the Urban Environment (Gibbs 1997). 
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European Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign, and the establishment of specific EU funds 
have contributed to promote inter-urban networking in the realm of sustainability (Bulkeley 
2005).   
The cooperation among European cities on sustainability has resulted in collaborative projects 
and programmes, but especially in the participation in transnational municipal networks 
devoted to sustainability-related issues - called socio-ecological urban networks (SEUNs) 
(Mocca 2017). The engagement of European cities in these organisations constitutes a political 
phenomenon that calls for an in-depth exploration of the reasons why issues related to 
sustainability require the concerted action of cities at supra-national level. While sustainability-
related issues are clearly important for cities, affected by pollution, social and economic 
disparities, cities’ engagement in SEUNs may be motivated by political and economic reasons 
that go beyond environmental concerns. In this sense, understanding the reasons underlying 
SEUN membership is important to shed light on whether transnational municipalism 
constitutes a policy strategy for local governments to achieve specific economic and political 
objectives.  
To examine the reasons for cities to engage at supra-national level, an analytical approach – 
termed elsewhere as “urban” (Mocca 2017) – centred on cities as the object of analysis is 
applied. From an empirical perspective, a small-N qualitative analysis involving seven 
European cities was undertaken to delve into the motivations underlying the decision to be part 
of networks dedicated to sustainability. In so doing, this article seeks to contribute to the 
literature on transnational municipalism, by providing an insight on the rationale behind 
European cities’ mobilisation on sustainability. 
The article is organised as follows. After this introduction, the analytical framework is 
introduced in Section 2 and explained in detail in Section 3. The methodology is presented in 
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Section 4, while the findings of the qualitative analysis are reported in Sections 5 and 6. A 
discussion of the results and final observations are provided in section 7. 
2. An urban perspective onto transnational municipalism 
The commitment of cities to achieve sustainability has spawned a host of research across a 
variety of disciplines. For instance, the literature on the science-policy interface has examined 
collaborations among local governments, experts and citizens in environmental policy-making 
(Munõz-Erickson 2014; White et al. 2008; Zborel et al. 2012), while research on sustainability 
planning has identified and analysed indicators, plans and policies to foster sustainability in 
cities (Pearsall and Pierce 2010; Taylor 2012; Wheeler 2013). Other streams of literature have 
devoted attention to inter-urban cooperation for sustainability and climate change. This topic 
has been explored through the lens of the policy mobility scholarship, which has critically 
examined the mechanisms of knowledge and policy transfer (Blok 2012; Temenos and McCann 
2012), as well as by the literature on transnational municipal networks (see inter alia Betsill 
and Bulkeley 2004, 2006; Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; Bulkeley et al. 2003; Giest and Howlett 
2013; Keiner and Kim 2007; Kern and Bulkeley 2009; Lee 2013; Toly 2008), which has shed 
light on the structure, the internal organisation, the functions, the policy outcomes and the 
external relations of the networks. 
Despite the important scholarly contribution of this latter body of literature, the reasons why 
cities participate in transnational municipal networks for sustainability have not received 
considerable attention. In particular, the mobilisation of European cities within the EU calls for 
a distinct analysis, in that it occurs in a peculiar context defined by the sui generis nature of the 
European Union’s architecture. 
To unpack the motivations for cities to participate in SEUNs, an urban-centred approach is 
adopted. This hinges on two main assumptions. Firstly, this approach conceives city-
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governments as political agents with an autonomous decision-making capacity. This entails 
that the choice to participate in SEUNs and the extent of their involvement is influenced by the 
interests and attitudes of the local political elite and by the benefits of SEUN membership 
expected by local policy-makers. This argument suggests that, to fully explore the phenomenon 
of transnational municipalism for sustainability, it is necessary to take into account the 
incentives that cities obtain from their engagement in SEUNs. Secondly, it is assumed that the 
choices of local governments are primarily embedded in the municipal context, whereby the 
political and institutional dynamics underpin cities’ participation in SEUNs. From this 
standpoint, the urban level exerts a far greater influence than the supra-national level. As noted 
elsewhere, this argument stands in contrast with much of extant research on the topic, for which 
the establishment of inter-urban networks is deemed to be favoured by the multi-level EU 
architecture (see Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Bulkeley et al., 2003; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; 
Heinelt and Niederhafner 2008; Kern and Bulkeley, 2009) (Mocca 2017). However, while 
providing an insight on the opportunities that the new modes of governance have opened up to 
local authorities, the multi-level governance approach does not examine the institutional and 
political dynamics playing out at municipal level, which are pivotal to gain an understanding 
of why cities are getting increasingly important in the political landscape. 
Moreover, many contributions in the field tends to emphasise the ‘environmentalness’ of inter-
urban cooperation for sustainability and climate change, with the risk of overlooking its 
political aspects. By way of contrast, in this article it is assumed that cities’ participation in 
SEUNs is driven more by the benefits provided than by the environmental preoccupations of 
the local political elites. 
Approaches focusing on cities as analytical units have been criticised by some scholars 
studying transnational municipal networks (see for example Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; 
Bulkeley and Betsill 2005), as being incapable of fully understanding the scope of this 
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phenomenon. Nevertheless, other authors have argued for a more exhaustive analysis of the 
role of cities in transnational processes. A compelling example can be found in Saunier and 
Ewen’s book (2008), which provides an historical analysis of transnational municipalism. 
There, Saunier argues that local governments are considered “as one embodiment of urban 
agency”, rather than “mere sites for the flows that have made and unmade the world”, warning 
not to conflate municipal governments with cities (Saunier and Ewen 2008, 9). Therefore, cities 
“are […] an appropriate target” for an historical analysis of the international engagement of 
local authorities (Saunier and Ewen 2008, 9). Drawing on this approach, Saunier and Ewen 
(2008, 177, 181) observe that, historically, transnational municipal networks have always been 
urban centred, in that cities acted at the same time (although not to the same extent) as “donors” 
and “recipient” through the dissemination of norms and practices. 
The development of an urban approach as an alternative to the multi-level framework is not 
aimed at questioning the validity of the empirical conclusions reached by previous research on 
transnational municipalism applying this approach. The argument here is about recalibrating 
the supra-national reflections over urban politics. This is to say that local governments still 
have decision-making autonomy over their destiny. Cities, amid globalising and 
Europeanisation forces, can still shape their identity and can choose with a certain degree of 
autonomy the instruments to do so. In this sense, supra-national phenomena have facilitated 
the presence of cities on the global stage; but these are enabling factors, rather than the 
motivations for cities to engage at international level. To summarise, the urban approach is a 
tool aimed at analysing the context in which participation in SEUNs is embedded, while taking 
into account the role that local policy-makers play in influencing SEUN membership. In the 
next section, the two working assumptions of the urban approach are discussed.  
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3. Local governments and SEUN engagement 
Before setting out the analytical framework here applied, it is appropriate to provide a 
definition of transnational municipalism and its cognate terms. Transnational municipalism is 
a phenomenon entailing the development of linkages among cities located in different states. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the outcome of such phenomenon are all the associative forms 
grouping localities, ranging from town twinning to urban cooperative networks. The latter can 
be categorised in sub-groups according to the policy issues tackled and the breadth of mission. 
While some city networks focus on one single specific issue, such as urban security or culture, 
the mission of other networks is more comprehensive, including social, environmental and 
economic themes. This latter type constitutes the research object of this article. 
[Figure 1 here] 
Having elucidated the main terms recurring in this article, in the next sub-sections, the two 
categories of motivations considered as drivers of European cities’ engagement in SEUNs are 
examined. 
 
3.1 The functional appeal of transnational municipal networks  
As mention previously, the first assumption of the approach here developed suggests that the 
engagement of cities in SEUNs is functional – i.e. incentive-oriented. SEUNs – and 
transnational municipal networks more broadly - are first and foremost cooperative 
organisations. As the vast literature on the collective action has shown, what underpins the 
decision to cooperate is the prospect of gaining benefits (see inter alia Laver 1997; Olson 1965; 
Taylor 1987). Notably, Olson (1965) states that participation in organisations is conditioned by 
the presence or absence of incentives, either in the form of benefit for the members, or sanctions 
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towards non-compliant members. Consequentially, one would expect local authorities be 
induced to engage in a network by the prospect of gaining benefits. More precisely, actors will 
be more likely to join SEUNs if the benefits of cooperating will be perceived as greater than 
the costs. 
Research contributions have underscored the importance of incentives associated with the 
participation of cities in supra-national initiatives. As Vion (2001 in Le Galès 2002, 108) 
argues, transnational municipal networks constitute the arena where “political and economic 
entrepreneurs” market local authorities to obtain financial and political benefits. Similarly, 
Betsill and Bulkeley (2004), with regard to cities’ engagement in the Climate Change 
Protection Programme (CCP), found that the highly committed local governments were 
attracted by the economic and political incentives and by cognitive and rule-making aspects 
that the network provided. Moreover, Betsill and Bulkeley (2004, 479-480) highlight the 
importance of “co-benefits”2 for network members and argue that “the exchange and 
production of material and nonmaterial resources are indeed factors in securing network 
participation”. Kübler and Piliutyte (2007, 367) consider policy learning as a motivation for 
cities to engage in networks, in that knowledge and experience exchange reduces information 
and “transaction costs” and enables cities to be updated on European urban policies. In 
particular, the importance of “collective incentives” (such as gaining importance at EU level) 
and selective incentives (as for example acquiring competences in a policy area) associated 
with the participation in transnational municipal networks has been highlighted by some 
authors (Kübler and Piliutyte 2007, 370, for the case of Eurocities). These aspects shed light 
on the capability of networks to act as means for collective action, through which cities can 
pursue common interests (see on this point Heinelt and Niederhafner 2008).  
                                                          
2 For example, Betsill and Bulkeley (2004) found that in by participating in the CCP programme, the co-benefits 
for the members are financial savings, better air quality and improved quality of life at city level. 
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The incentives above discussed correspond to the functions undertaken by networks. These can 
be grouped in three main categories: formative, economic and political functions. Formative 
functions include information and knowledge sharing, capacity building and networking. A 
pivotal function performed by networks is facilitating the exchange of information, practice 
and knowledge, as emphasised by several authors3. Moreover, networks also enable “capacity 
building” and “policy implementation”, by equipping the members with the practical skills, 
tools and financial resources to implement the initiatives promoted by the networks (Andonova 
et al. 2009, 64; Bulkeley et al. 2003; Bulkeley and Newell 2010, 56-57). Furthermore, network 
engagements constitutes per se an important aspect for members, as some authors suggest 
(Happaerts et al. 2010; Niederhafner 2013). 
With regard to the economic functions performed by transnational municipal networks, 
Bennington and Harvey (1994) point out the role of networks as a means for local authorities 
to access EU funding. Through networks, local authorities can meet other European peers 
willing to set up project partnerships to bid into EU funding (Bulkeley et al. 2003; Kern and 
Bulkeley 2009; Ward and Williams 1997).  
The networks also fulfil political functions. One of these political activities is “coalition-
building, which involves forming alliances with like-minded actors who share certain goals in 
a given policy area” (Bomberg and Peterson 1998 in Happaerts et al. 2011, 325). A second 
political function is lobbying, as a sizeable number of authors have emphasised4. By lobbying 
at national and supra-national level, local governments have the opportunity to influence 
                                                          
3 See: Andonova et al. (2009); Bulkeley and Betsill (2003); Bulkeley et al. (2003); Bulkeley and Newell (2010); 
Kern (2009); Keiner and Kim (2007); Kern and Bulkeley (2009); Le Galès (2002); Leitner and Sheppard (1999); 
Marshall (2005); Ward and Williams (1997). 
4 See: Bennington and Harvey (1994); Betsill and Bulkeley (2006); Bulkeley and Betsill (2003); Bulkeley et al. 
(2003); Clarke (2009); Ewen (2008); Happaerts et al. (2010); Happaerts et al. (2011); Heinelt and Niederhafner 
(2008); Kern (2009); Kern and Bulkeley (2009); Kübler and Piliutyte (2007); Labaeye and Sauer (2013); Le Galès 




directly national governments and international organisations to obtain support for network 
programmes and policies (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003). By lobbying jointly with other network 
members, cities put in place collective actions that allow them to influence EU institution, 
which would be challenging for one city alone (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2008). Furthermore, 
local authorities, by developing direct links with the EU institutions, can “bypass” the central 
state, which is sometimes perceived as an antagonist (Ward and Williams 1997, 445). Finally, 
it is argued that, although networks do not generally have binding rules regulating membership 
and network functions, “rule setting” may be a central function to some networks, which 
establish rules for the members, drawn on international or national norms, or generate new 
standards to fill a lack of regulation (Andonova et al. 2009, 65).  
These networks’ functions are seen by several authors as the objectives of transnational 
municipal networks conceived as collective units. However, by concentrating the analysis on 
the individual actors involved, then such functions, or “structural goals” of networks (as 
defined by Niederhafner 2013, 381), may be seen as incentives for cities to participate in 
transnational municipal networks.  
In addition to the prospect of gaining incentives, non-financial factors can also prompt cities to 
cooperate, as discussed in the ensuing sub-section. 
 
3.2 The municipal political milieu 
The second assumption at the core of the urban approach is that cities’ engagement in SEUNs 
is embedded in municipal politics. In this regard, the rich scholarship on institutional decision-
making processes suggest that decisions to cooperate are not only spurred by the opportunity 
to gain benefits, but are mediated by the context within which are taken (see e.g. Etzioni 1967, 
1988; Sabatier 1988). Accordingly, decision-making is not exclusively aimed at the 
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maximisation of the actors’ utility, but it is “loaded” with the normative beliefs of the deciding 
actors (Etzioni 1988). This means that decisions are embedded in a specific political 
environment and institutional culture stratified over time. Municipal political culture can be 
defined as a set of political values developed across a medium-long timespan that influences 
(more or less consciously) the decision-making of the city government. The political culture in 
a council may be the result of the long permanence of a party in government, which exerted a 
sort of cultural hegemony by mainstreaming party core ideological principles in the policy 
practice of the municipality. Notably, political values derive from “the transforming, creative 
sociopolitical practice of the social forces that meet the requirements of social progress and of 
the development of human personality on a social scale” (Kallos and Trasnea 1982: 182). While 
their development is prompted by societal forces and perceptions, their institutionalisation – 
i.e. the settlement of these values in an institutional environment - is chiefly enabled by ruling 
political parties, in particular those that have governed for a long time. The development of a 
political culture is a phenomenon both exogenous and endogenous to the political institutions. 
On the one hand, voters determine the leaning of the council and articulate the political demand. 
On the other, political culture is also produced endogenously, in that the political elite shapes 
the culture by bringing their personal ideologies and beliefs. At municipal level, the political 
milieu is shaped by three main factors: the council’s political outlook, the presence of political 
champions and the council’s history of inter-urban cooperation (or lack thereof).  
With regard to the first element, it can be argued that the political outlook of the council may 
influence the decision to participate in European city networks. This means that the position of 
the ruling party/coalition on SEUN engagement may affect the scope of the European 
engagement of the local government. In effect, given the highest number of seats in the council, 
the governing majority may be able to impose its decisions over SEUN engagement, which are 
determined by the position of the ruling majority on the EU affairs and/or on sustainability. 
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Therefore, it could be expected that those parties with a pro-EU and an ecologist bent – which, 
broadly speaking, are positioned on the centre-left of the political spectrum - will be keen on 
participating in SEUNs (Mocca 2017). More precisely, the longer a party stays in government, 
the more likely is for it to impose its political position on SEUN membership. In this regard, 
empirical research found that the local council’s political leaning – determined by the colour 
of the party governing the longest over a 30-year period - while not impacting on the SEUN 
membership, influences the scope of the involvement, with left-leaning councils more likely to 
be members of a higher number of SEUNs (Mocca 2017). Moreover, Leitner and Sheppard 
(2002, 496) highlight how political parties may elaborate different interpretations of inter-
urban cooperation, identifying a progressive conceptualisation of networks, which are depicted 
“as an alternative to market”, and a neo-liberal interpretation, which sees these structures as a 
means to expand capitalist ideas. This suggests that a new ruling party/coalition, even if it does 
not share a pro-SEUN position, may not break the previous commitments taken at EU level. 
Although ideology guides the positioning of a party on a given issue, this is mediated by 
individual politicians, whose personal aspirations and interests concur to orient policy-making. 
In this sense, local governments’ participation in networks is also affected by the individual 
aims and beliefs of the elected (and to some extent non-elected) officials involved in the 
networks. Therefore, some council members may support SEUN engagement driven by their 
pro-European and ecologist vision and/or by the collective (i.e. for their party or for the city) 
and/or personal benefits they can get out of it. On this latter point, Payre and Saunier (2008) 
argue that the personal and collective interests of the local representatives determine the extent 
to which municipalities are involved in the activities of the networks. Through the participation 
in networks, local officials gain the opportunity to lobby at the EU institutions and have a 
chance to influence EU legislation at their advantage, thus gaining political influence at EU 
level. As some authors observe, the development of a European profile for their city may boost 
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local politicians’ personalities (Bennington and Harvey 1994; Borraz and John 2004; Payre and 
Saunier 2008). For example, Payre and Saunier (2008, 81) argue that different mayors of Lyon 
have exploited their role in Eurocities as “a stepping-stone for their political careers”.  
Decisions about SEUN engagement are also influenced by the previous experience of a city in 
a network. More precisely, the continuous engagement in SEUN may be path-dependent or 
simply rolling due to the unquestioning of SEUN membership (Mocca 2017). As a significant 
thread of scholarship shows, political decision-making is strongly path-dependent (e.g., 
Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). Again, changes in SEUN membership may not necessarily be 
affected by changes of the political make-up of the local council. To illustrate this argument, 
graphically displayed in Figure 2 below, it may be assumed that at a given time (t0) a council 
is led by a pro-network party. Hence, it may be hypothesised that the new council will be keen 
on joining a European city network (named Y). If during the mandate, the politicians and local 
officials in charge of the network-related activities can identify benefits of membership in Y 
that are valued far greater than the costs of the involvement, then - all other things being equal 
- the local government will be more likely to stay in the network Y, regardless of which party 
will gain the majority of seats in the council in the following mandate. Therefore, if 
participation in the network is generally perceived as being beneficial, even the election of an 
anti-network party in the council (t1) may not lead to a withdrawal from the network. At most, 
the new majority, more hostile to EU network engagement, may reduce the scope of the 
involvement in Y, for instance by selecting the number of activities in which to participate or 
by withdrawing from other less profitable networks. By way of contrast, if the previous 
experience in the network Y is not considered as being beneficial, then the likelihood for the 
city to leave this network would be higher.  
[Figure 2 here] 
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Although simplifying a little, the hypothetical situation discussed above indicates that party 
politics, individual political personalities and the previous experience in networks define the 
political context in which the decision on participation in SEUNs is taken. These political 
factors, together with the prospect of gaining incentives, concur to shed light on European 
cities’ participation in SEUNs. 
4. Methodology 
The urban approach above outlined was devised to provide the theoretical framework within 
which to inscribe the research question. To shed light on the incentives and factors that explain 
European cities’ participation in SEUNs, a small-N qualitative research design involving a 
sample of European cities was applied. 
To avoid an arbitrary sampling strategy, the sample was selected drawing on a previous 
quantitative study on the topic (Mocca 2017). In the latter, which employed a dataset including 
210 European second and third cities5, an OLS regression was run using as a dependent variable 
the number of SEUNs of which cities were members of and a set of socio-economic 
independent variables6. According to the study, the cities that are more likely to participate in 
a higher number of SEUNs: 1) were governed for most of the period from 1985 to 2013 by 
parties/coalitions at the left of the centre; 2) have advanced economic activities (research, 
advanced technology industries etc.); 3) are entitled of an administrative status (province, 
regional capital or more simply the major city of a territorial unit), and 4) are members of at 
least one non sustainability-related network, which suggests a higher propensity to cooperate 
internationally.  
                                                          
5 The dataset used by the study was built on the Urban Audit database compiled by Eurostat. 
6 The independent variables included in the regression are: progressive city, modern city, cooperative attitude, 
environmental performance, strong mayor, administrative status. For further information, see Mocca (2017). 
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Employing the same dataset and the predictors of SEUN membership as the abovementioned 
article, the following cities were included in the sample for the qualitative analysis: 
Birmingham, Cremona, Hamburg, Lille, Malmö, Manchester and Turin. The data were 
gathered mainly through face-to-face semi-structured interviews undertaken between 
November 2013 and March 2014. When arranging interviews was not possible, telephone 
interviews were carried out. When participants declined the invitation to participate in an 
interview due to time constraints, semi-structured questionnaires were sent out containing all 
the questions asked during the interviews (see Table 1). The topics discussed during the 
interviews are the following: 1) reasons to join one or more European urban networks for 
sustainable development; 2) direct and indirect benefits of membership; 3) financial and non-
financial costs of membership; 4) network membership as part of the City’s internationalisation 
strategy; 5) network membership as part of the City’s environmental strategy; 6) process of 
joining and withdrawing from a network; 7) influence of politics over network membership. 
The participants included five local councillors and ten officers with knowledge and experience 
of SEUNs (Table 1). Both categories of respondents were involved at various degrees in 
different networks with different roles. While some of the participants held executive positions, 
others had no prominent roles within networks. The interviewees worked on different thematic 
areas of a network, such as energy, environment or culture. The councillors and officers 
participating in the interviews worked within their local councils on two main areas: 
environment/sustainability/climate change or International/European affairs. One participant 
(LLL3) was more involved in an international urban network than in European networks. The 
participant was included in the study since some of the networks considered in the quantitative 
study have also an international reach, such as Euromed7. Furthermore, MNC3 was not a 
                                                          
7 Network of Mediterranean cities. 
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member of any European networks, but agreed to participate in this study after having 
experience in working with partners from other European cities and from working with 
colleagues involved in networks. The participant can thus be considered as an informant, 
displaying knowledge of the topic derived by the role covered, albeit not being directly 
involved in networks, as well as expertise on the environmental aspect. 
[Table 1 here] 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim8. A thematic analysis was then carried 
out to explore in-depth the themes and the causal patterns emerging from the interview 
transcripts. Two comprehensive thematic categories were identified: the first comprises the 
incentives underpinning participation in SEUNs identified by the respondents. The second 
category systematises a set of themes related to the municipal political environment of the case 
studies.  
5. Incentives 
The qualitative evidence showed that the engagement of European cities in SEUNs is fuelled 
by economic, formative and political incentives, as will be discussed in the ensuing sub-
sections. 
 
5.1. Economic incentives 
Some of the participants highlighted the economic benefits derived from European networking 
(LLL1), while several respondents indicated the possibility of finding partners for projects as 
a motivation to join networks. The establishment of project partnerships among network 
                                                          
8 Only the digressions not pertinent to the topic of the interviews were not transcribed. 
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members opens up opportunities for cities to access European funding. Thanks to the personal 
connections developed among members, the networks allow potential partners for EU projects 
to be found. As BGM1 argued, by developing personal contacts, members create a 
“readymade” network of potential partners for EU projects.  
Albeit constituting an important source of money (BGM2), all the respondents agreed on the 
fact that funding is definitely not the main motivation to engage in a network. Partly this is 
because EU funding complements, but does not replace local and national funding (CRM; 
BGM1; BGM2; MNC1). More precisely, as some respondents suggested, being a network 
member does not give automatic access to EU funding: although networks are a means to find 
project partners, to obtain funding it is necessary to be actively engaged in a network and 
propose a good project to the European institutions (MLM2; TRN1). Therefore, network 
membership does not increase the likelihood to get funding per se. What matters is the ability 
of cities to develop innovative projects - a key factor to obtain EU funding. As BGM2 stated, 
an important reason for the involvement in SEUNs is regeneration, and “that’s about European 
funding”.  
Participation in SEUNs also helps cities to develop their image. Some participants identified 
visibility and the possibility to raise cities’ international profile as benefits deriving from 
engagement in European networks (LLL3; HMG; MLM1; MNC1; TRN1). Some interviewees 
suggested that the involvement in European networks is a way to market cities (BGM1 and 
TRN1), serving as channels for “territorial marketing” (TRN1). In effect, within networks, 
cities have the chance to talk about themselves, to showcase to other European cities the 
successful achievements of policies and projects implemented at urban level, and hence to build 
their international reputation. A case in point is Manchester. The strong engagement of the 
local council in Eurocities - signalled by their presence in the network executive committee, 
their nomination to the presidency and the hosting of network events - was motivated, in 
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addition to the other factors discussed previously, by the willingness to put “Manchester back 
on the map” (MNC1).  
 
5.2. Formative incentives 
The evidence shows that the most significant incentive for local authorities to participate in 
SEUNs is the opportunity to learning and sharing ideas and information. Through networks, 
cities can gather information about policies and projects developed by other European peers, 
but also about how EU legislation was interpreted and implemented in other cities. In this sense, 
the network is a “learning environment” (TRN1), where participants get to know new ideas 
and practices developed in other European cities. What is more, given the absence of 
intermediation of national or regional governments, European urban networks deliver the flow 
of information from the EU institutions more quickly (LLL1). Network members have also the 
opportunity receive advice and feedback from other cities (MLM1) as well as to improve their 
practical knowledge especially on how to apply for EU funding (MNC1; TRN1).  
The opportunity to exchange information and learning from other experience is made possible 
by the establishment of permanent contacts among the members. Through networks, the 
members have the chance to personally know other colleagues in Europe and get in touch with 
experts and/or local officers (BGM1; BGM2; CRM; HMG; MLM1; MLM2; MNC3). Through 
the networks, local authorities can discuss common problems and learn how other cities have 
dealt with specific issues (CRM). As LLL3 stated, one of the main benefits is the opportunity 
to gather “knowledge about how others work”, which gives “the perception that there isn’t just 
only one way of doing things, but many ways of doing things with the same objective”.  
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Moreover, the evidence shows that participation in SEUNs provides the members with the 
opportunity to compare themselves with other European peers and as a result, to identify their 
strengths and weaknesses in terms of urban policy and planning. Interestingly, those cities that 
have successfully tackled specific urban problems become a source of inspiration for other 
cities - what LLL2 defined as “the virtue of imitating”.  
 
5.3. Political incentives  
The political incentives provided by SEUNs include lobbying and the possibility to influence 
indirectly the nation-states. As the evidence suggest, by participating in European networks, 
cities can exert a certain degree of influence over EU institutions (BGM1; HMG; MLM1). In 
effect, networks enable cities to undertake collective action and thus enhance their political 
weight in the European decision-making. As BGM1 stated:  
“there are other ways of getting access as an individual city, but you’ll always just be 
an individual city, we’ll just be Birmingham or Manchester, or whoever you are. And 
be able to speak on behalf of all, effectively, all cities across Europe […] lends a lot of 
more weight to trying to make changes at EU level.”  
Similarly, MNC4 argued that  
“Groups of cities together with a common agenda can have far more influence on the 
European Commission for example than by cities acting singularly. I think that 
particularly coming out of America, the idea of metropolitan areas being masters of 
their own destiny really. Having a greater say in their own affairs is pretty universal 
across most cities, but not universally accepted by most of national governments. 
Certainly not ours.”  
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Therefore, through networks, members try to influence EU decision-making by sending a 
“collective political message” to European institutions (MNC1) and even “join[ing] against the 
Commission” (HMG). In particular, networks enable local authorities to lobby at European 
level with the aim of making sure that the Commission and other EU institutions understand 
the urban dimension (BGM1; BGM2) and the challenges faced by cities (BGM1). The ultimate 
goal of lobbying is thus to ensure that the role of cities is recognised in European funding 
programmes and EU legislation (BGM1; BGM2; MLM2; MNC1). Some participants 
highlighted the importance of including the urban perspective in EU legislation, to ensure that 
“policy is not harmful to cities” (BGM1) and to avoid adverse impacts on some cities while 
benefiting others (MCN4).  
The evidence gathered seems to suggest that networks enable the establishment of a direct 
relation between local authorities and the EU, without necessarily passing through the national 
state. In this respect, one respondent noted that the common European praxis is that the EU 
deals with member-states, which implement directives into national legislation, and then this 
goes down at regional and local level (MLM2). Nonetheless, networks allow the creation of a 
“strong link” between cities and the EU Commission, the Parliament and the Committee of the 
Regions and with other member-states (TRN2).  
According to the findings, it appears that national governments do not serve as a mediator 
between local authorities and the EU institutions. By way of contrast, the evidence depicts an 
image of the EU as a mediator between local and national governments. Cities’ engagement in 
networks enables them to exert an indirect influence over national decision-making. In this 
respect, BGM1 claimed that the role of cities in networks “is about getting at the European 
level into the policies, all the directives, the legislation.” However, if agreed at European level, 
the central government has to take into account cities’ requests (BGM1). As BGM1 put it 
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clearly, for the local government, “European engagement is a way of influencing national 
policy, bypassing it sometimes.” The mediated pressure exerted by cities on national 
governments through the EU institutions provides cities with more political leeway. For TRN1, 
to some extent the networks have enabled cities to bypass the central state, a process fostered 
by the subsidiarity principle, which has enforced the participation of those non-state actors 
closer to citizens in the decision-making. For some participants networks give a certain degree 
of economic autonomy (BGM2; CRM; MCN4), insofar as the network membership assists the 
local economic development, which in turn provides local authorities with a certain degree of 
“self-sufficiency” (BGM2). Similarly, MNC4 stated that cities acquire more policy autonomy 
from participating.  
As most of the respondents acknowledged, their capacities are bound to national laws and 
constitutional arrangements, thus they cannot really acquire more autonomy by participating 
in European networks. Nevertheless, European involvement enables cities to influence national 
policy – that is, to influence the “philosophy” of national administration (LLL2).  
From the data collected, it appears that the endemic opposition between national and local level 
about the definition of their competencies is projected at the European level, where local 
authorities can find allies on this issue. The collective action undertaken at EU level strengthens 
the scope of the requests for more freedom – or, rather, “self-sufficiency”, as BGM2 defined 
it. Interestingly, MNC3 argued that the network is  
“a forum to make that case and make the point about EU” [and] “it is partly a 
pitch to national government and Europe about recognising the importance of 
cities and helping cities to have the policy frameworks they need in order to be 
able to develop the best effect”. 
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As suggested by MNC3, the success of policies implemented in other localities is used by the 
city “as an argument back to the government […] for more freedom and flexibility” to be able 
to emulate those examples. Hence, the use of examples from other European cities helps to 
make the case for broadening their policy-making capacities.  
 
5.4. The assessment of SEUN membership 
Although the respondents did not identify any significant disadvantage deriving from network 
membership, there are some costs associated to it. The main financial costs indicated by the 
majority of the respondents are the membership fees, followed by travel costs, indicating both 
money and time for attending meetings and events organised by the networks (BGM2; HMG; 
LLL1; MLM2; MNC3).  
For what concerns non-financial costs, the main issue with SEUN engagement is the lack of 
time (BGM1; LLL1; MLM2; MNC1; MNC3). Some of the respondents argued that a fruitful 
and serious involvement in networks is time consuming and requires the commitment of 
officers to deal with project management, meeting attendance etc. (BGM1; CRM; HMG; 
MLM2). Such workload adds up to other activities to which the council staff is already 
committed (MNC1). However, this is an “initial investment” that members have to pay to be 
involved, otherwise membership would be a waste (LLL3). In this respect, HMG stated that 
“joining networks without internal transition, without local reflection and without the attempts 
to get local effects is just [a social event]”. Similarly, TRN1 stated that the network does not 
provide any benefits if it is not used. A second issue brought up by some respondents is the 
limited human resources working on networks’ matters (CRM; LLL1; MNC4; TRN1). On this 
point, TRN1 highlighted the lack of linguistically competent personnel. 
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The evidence seems to suggest that membership and participation in SEUNs are two different 
conditions. As noted by Payre and Saunier (2008, 78), a local government may “merely pay 
their subscription fee” and then acquires the status of member, but it may decide not to 
participate in many initiatives of the networks or not to take any leading role. In this case, 
membership is merely nominal, since there is no active participation. By way of contrast, 
another local government may decide to participate in and contribute to several initiatives of a 
network. In this case, membership is the precondition for participation. Local governments may 
identify different costs and benefits associated with membership and participation and evaluate 
them differently. As exemplified in Table 2 below, if a local government evaluates the costs of 
membership and participation being too high (and higher than the potential benefits), then it 
will decide not to join. If a local government considers positively the prospect of joining a 
network, but evaluates the benefits of participation greater that the costs, it will be more likely 
to become an inactive member. By way of contrast, when both the benefits of membership and 
participation are considered higher than the costs, the city will have strong incentives to join 
and become an active member9.  
[Table 2 here] 
Given the current economic conditions, cities weight financial considerations in the decision 
to remain members. If network engagement comes to a high cost, then local authorities have to 
balance out the costs and benefits of participation (BGM1; LLL1; MNC4). In this respect, 
MNC4 pointed out the possible negative electoral payback of using part of the local budget to 
subsidize the network activities:  
“it’s quite difficult to explain to our citizens sometimes that we’re investing in European 
networks when we’re having to make decisions about closing facilities and services. 
                                                          
9 In this article, the focus is on cities actively participating in SEUNs. 
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Explaining balance of development and economic growth alongside their desire of not 
seeing their local library closed is quite hard, it’s a real challenge.”  
The respondent concluded that:  
“I think we will consider [network membership] alongside everything else. And we 
would never stop. We might have to scale back slightly, because of the economic 
situation. But in terms of the investment it brings, it has generally a very good rate of 
return.” 
This finding seems to suggest that the decision about SEUN engagement may also be affected 
by exogenous events, such as a severe economic crisis, which may impose a rationalisation of 
local spending. Therefore, the gravity of the economic situation may induce the ruling party, 
even if supporting SEUN membership, to withdraw or drastically reduce the European 
commitments, which may not be considered as essential.  
Despite the financial expenses, all the respondents agreed that the costs are offset by the 
benefits deriving from network engagement, provided that cities assume a proactive role in the 
networks’ activities. The participation in networks appears to be perceived by members as an 
investment, since they have to sustain financial costs - in terms of staff salaries, travel costs, 
event organisations and membership fees – to obtain some rewards. By weighting costs and 
benefits, cities decide whether they want to be fully committed or just being nominal network 
members. However, the choice of engaging in network is not simply dictated by a rational 




6. The municipal political milieu  
To examine the relationship between politics and SEUN participation, participants were asked 
questions as to whether local politics influences SEUN membership and how this plays out. 
More in detail, the following factors were explored: 1) party politics and political agency; 2) 
previous experience in networks, and 3) institutionalised values. 
 
6.1. Party politics and agency 
Most of the respondents argued that membership is not affected by changes in the political 
composition of the local council. Rather, as LLL3 suggested, there is continuity. Some 
respondents observed that councillors of any parties participate in European urban networks. 
Indeed, some participants argued that networks are not politically orientated, but they are more 
“practical” and “pragmatic”, since their work is about planning actions (BGM2; MNC3). 
Speaking about Eurocities, MNC3 stated that there is not “an issue about political control of 
Eurocities or anything like that. It’s much more practical in that. […] The political involvement 
in Eurocities is about making the case for cities”. HMG answered that party politics does not 
affect network membership very much; rather, the city decides to continue their activity in 
those networks that “bring benefits to the city”.  
However, some respondents argued that to some extent party politics may influence European 
city networking. For instance, BGM1 asserted that, with the recent change in the political 
composition of the council, the focus of international relations of the City shifted. The previous 
Conservative/Liberal-Democrat coalition government was more concerned with the 
development of relations with emerging economies, with the aim of enhancing investments and 
partnerships with them. However, the respondent pointed out that such orientation was dictated 
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more by the international strategy proposed by the Conservative party in the council, while the 
Liberal-Democrat deputy leader was very interested in the European dimension and supported 
the European engagement of the city. With the Labour party taking the majority of the council, 
European engagement gained more importance on the political agenda of the council. This 
view is partially supported by CRM, who argued that the revision of network membership 
might be prompted by a new party majority in the council. Furthermore, CRM stated that the 
content of the initiatives implemented within networks may actually clash with the political 
leaning of council – for instance, some working methods proposed by European networks such 
as citizens’ active participation. 
Most of the respondents agreed on the fact that, individual politicians have played a significant 
role in determining the scope of local authorities’ engagement in Europe. Some respondents 
emphasised the important role of agency in determining the involvement in SEUNs – but also 
in networks and European initiatives more generally (BGM1; BGM2; MLM2). For LLL1 the 
scope of engagement in SEUNs is a mix of personalities and parties: generally, greens are more 
active on sustainability, but also councils not governed by the green party may have a strong 
engagement in sustainability, when there is a political champion supporting such commitment.  
 
6.2. Institutionalised values 
The third element that completes the analysis of the drivers of SEUN participation are the 
values characterising the municipal political milieu. The overall attitude of the respondents 
towards networks was explored by running a word frequency query to find the most recurrent 
words in the data sources. The resulting words were grouped by semantic similarity10, as 
                                                          
10 The evidence collected from the respondents of the same city was merged to generate aggregate-level data for 
each local government. 
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reported in Table 3. The topics discussed the most by the respondents were grouped in eight 
semantic categories. The chart in Figure 3 shows how much the semantic categories are 
discussed by the seven cities.. 
[Table 3 here] 
The chart displayed in Figure 3 shows that Manchester highly focused on the economic aspects 
of SEUNs. It might be hypothesised that the prospect of economic benefits deriving from the 
engagement in European city networks is what appeals the most the city. Likewise, the content 
of the interview with the respondents from Birmingham mostly pivoted around the economic 
field, although to a lower degree than Manchester. By way of contrast, the participants from 
Malmö seem to have little interest on the economic theme, while being more focused on the 
“concerns” for the city. For Hamburg, the semantic area “policy-making”, which groups words 
such as policy, projects, actions etc., seems to matter the most for the city. Furthermore, the 
aspect of the participation in the networks plays a relevant role for Birmingham, Torino and 
Malmö. Another theme identified in the sources is “innovation”. This semantic field includes 
the concepts of “change” and “ideas”, in addition to words stemming from innovation. This 
aspect is not widely discussed by participants, especially by Birmingham, Cremona and 
Hamburg. The socio-ecological dimension is discussed by all the respondents, although it does 
not occupy a primary position as one might expect. In particular, the evidence collected from 
Hamburg and Torino does not count many references to environmental and social 
sustainability. Finally, the institutional sphere seems to be an important topic for the 
participants, especially for Hamburg and Lille. 
[Figure 3 here] 
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Figure 3 also helps to examine the type of attitude towards SEUN engagement. Manchester 
appears to have an instrumental approach to the EU: the city primarily engages in European 
networks because of the economic benefits they provide. As emerged in the interviews, the city 
gives importance to both economic (possibility to partner with other cities to bid into EU 
funding, place promotion etc.) and formative. As the chart shows, the institutional context, 
especially national, also plays a significant role in the discourse on network involvement. 
Birmingham seems also to be significantly interested in the economic incentives of SEUNs. 
Here, the respondents give almost equal importance to the socio-ecological dimension and the 
economic aspect, suggesting how these two themes are strongly intertwined. 
For Malmö network participation is strongly connected to the national context and it is about 
city’s objectives and priorities with networks’ work (category “concern”). Similarly, for 
Hamburg the institutional relationships are a relevant theme, although preceded by the topic 
“policy-making”. This suggests that the city conceives SEUN membership as a strategy to 
deliver specific policy outputs. The importance of the networks as a means for achieving policy 
objectives is also important for Cremona, which emphasises the aspect of “participation” in the 
networks.  
The institutional context is pivotal in Lille’s discourse on SEUN engagement. This theme is 
followed by the socio-ecological dimension, indicating how for Lille the environmental 
discourse is central to their participation in SEUNs. Moreover, the theme “Europe” recurs 
relatively frequently in the evidence on Lille. As an example, the respondents pointed out the 
long history of European engagement of the city and one of the interviewees (LLL3) 
emphasised how the geographical position of the city - at “the hearth of one part of Europe” - 
has played a significant role in determining the high level of interaction with other European 
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cities11. In this case, the peculiar geographical position of the city has contributed to the creation 
of a European culture.  
The theme “Europe” is even more relevant for Torino, whose European dimension has a long 
history dating back to the beginning of the 20th Century, and which still characterises its 
municipal politics (see Marucco and Accornero 2012). This theme is followed by “policy-
making”, suggesting the use of the European dimension to find policy solutions to tackle local 
problems. A closer analysis of the evidence supports this claim. TRN1 argued that the city 
began to engage at European level around the mid-Nineties, in correspondence with its 
industrial decline. As a result of the management of EU structural funds dedicated to industrial 
areas in decline, the city worked more with the EU level than with the central level. Actually, 
it was claimed that the European dimension became very important for the city in terms of 
innovative and advanced ideas about urban policy. Within the European dimension, the city 
could learn from and work with other European cities affected by de-industrialisation process. 
The evidence seems to suggest that the attitude towards SEUNs changes from one member to 
another: while some members have a functional approach, using the network to achieve their 
economic or policy objectives, others have a more value-oriented attitude, whereby SEUN 
membership stems from institutionalised values, such as a diffuse European culture or 
environmentalism, embedded in local politics. Finally, noteworthy is the importance that 
respondents place onto the institutional dimension: although cities autonomously decide to 
engage at European level, their action is bound to the central governments.  
 
                                                          
11 An example mentioned by the respondent is the engagement of the city in the creation of Eurométropole, or 
Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai Eurometropolis, a European Territorial Cooperation Group of 147 French and Belgian 




The participation in SEUNs appears to be path-dependent. Some of the respondents asserted 
that their cities have always been highly engaged in specific networks since they joined, and in 
some cases, they contributed to the establishment of some networks, such as Birmingham and 
Manchester in Eurocities. This historical path, based on the recognition of the importance of 
the European dimension and/or the commitment to sustainability - to various degree marks the 
present engagement of cities. For example, BGM2 argued that  
“politicians come and go, there will always be recognition in Birmingham - I would 
hope - that there is an important European dimension to our work, there is an important 
urban dimension to our work that goes beyond the city boundaries.”  
The continuity of the participation may be influenced by the reputation that a city has built 
overtime within a network. BGM1 stated that the city, through the work of both officers and 
politicians, acquired over the years a distinctive reputation in Eurocities for their high level of 
commitment, especially in the environment forum.  
The continuity of network membership may also be motivated by institutional inertia, since 
some cities continue their involvement because they have always done so. For example, LLL3 
argued that network membership is not formally discussed; rather, “sometimes networks are 
there because they have been there for 30 years” and nobody questions them (LLL3). The 
respondent reported that the local government was still member of a European organisation 
grouping cities with a textile industry, although in Lille this sector was dismantled long time 
ago. Therefore, local governments display different attitudes towards the ongoing participation 
in networks: while for some cities their active participation is part of a strategic decision to 
keep their commitments in continuity with the past, for others their lingering membership is 
the outcome of a non-decision to withdraw from a given network. 
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7. Discussion and conclusions 
In this article, the motivations underpinning European local governments’ SEUN engagement 
were explored by adopting an urban-centred approach. The latter permitted an analysis of the 
incentives and the political factors prompting European cities to engage in SEUNs. Drawing 
on a small-N qualitative analysis, this article showed that the involvement of European cities 
in SEUNs is fuelled by economic, formative and political incentives and is influenced by the 
municipal political environment, defined by the overall council’s political outlook, the presence 
of political champions and the previous experience in networks.  
The evidence showed that the prospect of exchanging information and experience with other 
European peers constitutes a significant spur for cities to engage in SEUNs, since members 
have at their disposal a series of policy solutions from which they can take cue to tackle local 
issues. The importance of networks as a means for information and knowledge sharing and 
problem-solving has been underscored by various authors12. However, Betsill and Bulkeley 
(2004, 490) found that those member-cities that were pro-actively involved in the CCP network 
were more interested in the economic and political benefits and in “processes of knowledge 
creation and norm generation” than in the sharing of experiences and competencies. By way of 
contrast, the findings of the qualitative analysis showed that learning and knowledge sharing 
is the most important motivations for cities to join SEUNs.  
Another benefit of SEUN engagement valued by members is that they functions as “shop-
windows” (Mocca 2017). The place marketing potential of network is also highlighted in the 
literature (Church and Reid 1996; Ewen 2008; Phelps et al. 2002). For instance, Betsill and 
                                                          
12 See: Acuto (2013); Andonova et al. (2009); Bulkeley and Betsill (2003); Bulkeley et al. (2003); Bulkeley and 
Newell (2010); Clarke (2012); Ewen (2008); Ewen and Hebbert (2007); Goldsmith (1993); Happaerts et al. 
(2011); Kern (2009); Keiner and Kim (2007); Kern and Bulkeley (2009); Le Galès (2002); Marshall (2005); Ward 
and Williams (1997). 
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Bulkeley (2004) acknowledge the importance of the CCP network in helping some members 
to develop an environmental profile. In turn, the creation of a positive reputation may increase 
the financial return of cities by attracting businesses, companies and tourists. Keiner and Kim 
(2007, 1393) argue that some cities - such as Barcelona - have been able to use transnational 
municipal organisations to develop a profile as “future-oriented environmentally-friendly 
liveable cities” and to capitalise on the development of the service sector. 
The involvement of cities in SEUNs is also motivated by political incentives, since local 
governments use the network as a means to widen their political influence on the EU 
institutions and indirectly on national governments. In this respect, Payre and Saunier (2008) 
suggest that Eurocities can be conceived as “a pressure group that represents the interests of 
large cities in and around the European Union’s institutions” (Payre and Saunier 2008, 72). 
Additionally, Kübler and Piliutyte (2007) argue that, by participating in Eurocities, cities have 
the opportunity to enhance their importance on European issues and fine-tune their knowledge 
and competences on a particular theme, which in turn allows them to improve their position on 
the European stage. Furthermore, participation in a network constitutes a shortcut for cities to 
directly reach the supra-national level. To some extent, SEUN engagement is the expression of 
a centrifugal localism: cities perceiving the constraining role of the central state tend to be 
keener to engage in supra-national urban networks. The tension between the local and the 
national levels has been identified by some authors. Bulkeley and Betsill (2003, 190) found 
that the CCP programme, on the one hand, has enabled the members to adopt independent 
decisions and “bypass” central governments; on the other, it is “a state-based organization” 
inasmuch as the member-cities often collaborate with the nation-state. In particular, Bulkeley 
and Betsill’s (2003, 191) study of the CCP programme suggests that, in the field of 
environmental policy, the “hollowing out” of the state and the  “multilevel governance” turn 
do not imply the reduction of sovereignty of the nation-state. Le Galès (2002), while analysing 
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the reduced role of the nation-state as a result of European integration and the devolution of 
powers to sub-national authorities, also admits that nation-states are an integral part of the 
European architecture. Similarly, Church and Reid’s (1996) study on the Transmanche region 
found a growing participation of the national level in the Interreg programme.  
Finally, the possibility to build project partnership with other network members constitutes a 
motivation for cities to participate in SEUNs. The opportunity for members to set up project 
partnerships with other European local authorities is also highlighted by some authors, as 
discussed in section 3.1. Conversely, the economic incentives do not seem to be a direct 
motivation for joining SEUNs. EU funding can be obtained only through the establishment of 
partnerships with other cities and the submission of a winning application for funding. 
Similarly, Betsill and Bulkeley (2004) note that network engagement does not ensure the 
provision of funding, which is conditioned to the submission of a successful application. By 
way of contrast, Payre (2010) observes that for local authorities in the Midlands (UK), 
economic benefits constituted a primary motivation for their involvement in supra-national 
initiatives, seen by local politicians and economic actors as an opportunity to address the 
problems derived from the decline of the industrial sector and to boost the tourism sector. 
Therefore, the prospect of economic benefits constitutes a second-level explanation to inter-
urban cooperation. 
The evidence seems to partly lend support to the assumption about the influence of the political 
milieu. If political agency as well as past experience in networks appear to be important in 
determining the engagement in SEUNs, the role of party politics is not completely clear: while 
for few respondents some aspects of SEUN engagement seem to be affected by political 
positions of the members, for others SEUNs are not influenced by political views. The role of 
local politics in determining the engagement of cities in European networks has been 
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acknowledged by some authors. For instance, Payre and Saunier (2008, 72-73) see “the 
political affiliations and worldviews of mayors and councillors, the existence of knowledge-
based transnational networks amongst municipal technicians, and the adaptation or resistance 
to changes in the urban world order” as “important mitigating factors” affecting cities’ choice 
to participate in an urban organisation. By way of contrast, Church and Reid (1996) found that 
the diverging political leaning of the two members of the Transmanche Metropole did not 
hinder their collaboration, partially due to their availability to reach an agreement. 
Through a more in-depth analysis of the evidence, it was possible to infer that institutionalised 
values and attitudes towards European networks may play a role in explaining cities’ 
international commitment. In addition to pragmatic economic motivations, SEUN engagement 
appears to be determined by a blend of institutionalised values and attitudes incorporated in 
local politics, such as environmentalism, international openness and pro-EU attitudes. Since 
participants’ positions on European integration or on ecological matters were inferred from an 
in-depth analysis of the evidence, the impact of values and attitudes on SEUN engagement 
should be treated with some caution.  
To summarise, the findings presented in this article show that European cities’ engagement in 
SEUNs is motivated by the selective incentives provided to the members. However, SEUN 
engagement should not be seen as purely dictated by instrumental reasons, in that the choice 
as to whether engage in these networks is not made in a value-free environment, but is 
embedded in a political and institutional context. In other words, political factors “load” the 
perception of the expected benefits of SEUN involvement: a municipal political milieu 
favourable to inter-urban cooperation weights in local governments’ decision as to whether and 
how much to engage in SEUNs. 
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While this article sought to provide an empirical contribution to research on transnational 
municipalism, some limitations have to be acknowledged. Firstly, the small-N research design, 
given the considerable number of cities involved (and not) in SEUNs, may be seen a weakness. 
Nonetheless, a wider sample including small and capital cities would have made it difficult to 
undertake an intensive analysis. Furthermore, the sample of cases used in the qualitative 
analysis is justified by the selection of cases drawing on previous large-N research, which has 
made more robust and reliable the case selection process. Finally, the focus only on SEUN 
members and the parallel exclusion of non-members was motivated by the goal of providing 
an exhaustive overview of the potential motivations underlying cities’ engagement in these 
organisations. The comparison between members and non-members’ choice would be better 
addressed by quantitative research. Secondly, as with any qualitative studies, the conclusions 
reached by this article may not apply to other forms of sub-national mobilisation or for other 
types of networks. Nevertheless, the confirmation of the findings of the qualitative analysis 
provided by previous research in the realm of transnational municipal networks and in tangent 
fields seems to suggest that a certain degree of inference is possible, especially with regard to 
the importance of the incentives. 
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